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ABSTRACT 
 
Fourth Amendment Search Incident to Arrest in the Home: Why Gant’s New Vehicular 
Rules Should Supersede Chimel 
 
  
The purpose of this article is to reveal and propose a solution for the current 
misguided search incident to arrest doctrine in homes and vehicles. As a result from 
modern Supreme Court cases, the rules controlling searches incident to arrest are inverted 
for homes and vehicles. Homes possess a higher expectation of privacy, but currently 
have less protection from invasive police searches than vehicles. This constitutionally 
incorrect doctrine is a consequence of Arizona v Gant’s decision to return vehicular 
searches to the original intent of Chimel v California. However, interpretations of Gant 
failed to make the same adjustment in home searches. To reconcile the doctrinal tension, 
the Courts have two options: 1) overturn Gant so that Chimel is once more the controlling 
doctrine for both homes and vehicles or 2) import Gant’s restricted reaching distance and 
evidence gathering prongs into the home to restore constitutional privacy expectations. 
This article proposes that the Courts need to import Gant’s two prongs because it will not 
only reconcile the doctrines, but it also acts as a corrective decision that re-tethers search 
incident to arrest doctrine to its original purpose.  
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Fourth Amendment Search Incident to Arrest in the Home: Why Gant’s New Vehicular 
Rules Should Supersede Chimel  
 
Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment protects the American people from unreasonable police 
searches and seizures, and no area is more constitutionally protected than the home. This 
Constitutional provision is intrinsic in our national fabric and is the basis for many legal 
doctrines. Reasonableness can by qualified by the presence of a search warrant issued 
with probable cause. There are numerous exceptions to this broad Fourth Amendment 
definition of reasonable searches, including warrantless searches incident to a lawful 
arrest.  
Search incident to arrest is a situation in which an officer is allowed a warrantless 
search of the arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control. It 
seems relatively straightforward but has a history of meandering Supreme Court 
decisions, operating on a pendulum as opposed to the linear path of precedent. The 
tumultuous history depicts a trend that conveys the Court’s varying preference for 
privacy rights versus crime control. In the sixties the Court interpreted search incident to 
arrest in a way that was very protective of privacy rights; however, by the eighties, the 
Court reinterpreted search incident to arrest into an adaptation more favorable for law 
enforcement.  
These polarizing interpretations are descriptive of the political climate of both 
decades, which speaks to the instability of Supreme Court decisions. Currently, doctrinal 
tension is a problematic consequence of the swinging interpretations of search incident to 
2 
arrest. Homes have been routinely more protected from police searches than vehicles, but 
modern Supreme Court rulings have switched the levels of protection for searches 
incident to a lawful arrest. Homes are protected under Chimel while vehicles are 
controlled by Gant’s doctrine. Officers are allowed to search a home under a lenient 
interpretation of reaching distance, whereas officers have a much more restricted reach in 
vehicular cases. As a result of the varying interpretations of reaching distance, vehicles 
receive greater protection than homes. This is an issue that has to be resolved through the 
Courts.  
Arizona v Gant is the case responsible for search incident to arrest doctrinal 
conflict because it affords vehicles greater protection from police intrusion than homes. 
By overlooking the standard expectation that homes warrant more privacy protection than 
vehicles, the Court incorrectly designated law enforcement’s range and authority to 
search incident to arrest by creating stricter rules for vehicles. However, the juxtaposition 
of Chimel v California (homes) and Gant (vehicles) exposes the fictional reasoning 
behind modern search incident to arrest doctrine. Gant doctrinally erodes the modern 
lenient interpretation of Chimel and returns Chimel to its original intent in vehicles but 
has not eroded Chimel in homes. Search incident to arrest doctrine has been erratic for the 
last century and the lack of consistency created a complication that cannot be allowed to 
remain in the American legal framework. 
By trying to reverse one hundred years of uncertainty, the Court inverted the 
consistent range of police authority. The Court curtailed the reach of law enforcement in 
vehicles but let their reach remain unchecked in homes. Gant restricts the reaching 
distance available to officers but supplements this restriction with an evidence gathering 
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search to balance diminished police interest. The logic behind Gant is simple, Chimel’s 
attempt to restrict police intrusion through reaching distance is no longer tenable. 
However, by confining Chimel to its stringent interpretation and incorporating an 
evidence gathering search to offset the subsequent limitations, the original purpose of 
Chimel will be achieved. 
 This article argues that there are two solutions to the current doctrinal tension 
problem. Either overturn Gant’s decision and re-unify the two spaces or import Gant’s 
restricted reaching distance and evidence gathering into the home. Gant exposes Chimel 
as the case that arbitrarily overturned precedent and ignored common law to become the 
nexus of modern search incident to arrest confusion. Because Gant is a corrective 
decision, it logically follows that it should be imported into the home instead of being 
overturned.  
The pattern of search incident to arrest reveals a consistent attempt to orchestrate 
palatable doctrine regardless of reality. It began with Chimel v California’s deviation 
from precedent and common law. Chimel removed evidence gathering as a tool for law 
enforcement and changed the justification behind search incident to arrest to the dual 
rationale of officer safety and evidence preservation. Chimel set two guidelines to control 
the scope of law enforcement once a search is allowed. 1) Searches must be 
contemporaneous to the arrest and 2) within the “immediate control” of the arrestee. 
However, there was disagreement on a consistent range and scope to define “immediate 
control.” The result was a litany of litigation to provide clear guidelines for police 
procedure. 
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New York v Belton clarified Chimel’s scope by creating a bright line rule that 
delineated the space available to search in vehicles. By implementing a one size fits all 
policy, it revealed the true justifications behind Chimel. The Belton search removed the 
spatial and temporal components of Chimel, in other words it removed the two supposed 
justifications to search. After the Belton decision, officers were always able to search the 
interior of the vehicle, passenger compartment, and all containers within following an 
arrest. 
Law enforcement was able to conduct the search even if the suspect was 
handcuffed and removed from the scene. They could perform the same expansive search 
in every situation, no matter the reason for the arrest. The intention was to further solidify 
officer safety and to offer a template to decrease confusion regarding the definition of 
“immediate control”. However, Belton’s new rules clearly failed to abide by Chimel’s 
two justifications. 
Arizona v Gant overturned Belton because it exceeded Chimel’s boundaries, but 
the Court did not limit their inspection at Belton. Once Belton bypassed Chimel’s rules, 
the Court began to question the validity of Chimel as a single entity. Were Chimel’s rules 
arbitrary? Was the true purpose behind its two justifications to conduct evidence-
gathering searches under a politically correct guise? The article proposes that was exactly 
what Chimel did and the Gant Court recognized this.  
Arizona v Gant acknowledged the original miscarriage of legality, the mutated 
evolution of justifications behind the reasons to search incident to arrest, and corrected 
the problem in vehicular cases. Because Gant was a case about a search incident to arrest 
in a vehicle, it was easy to narrow the subsequent policy to only vehicles. Gant and 
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Belton both operated in a vehicular context. Because of this, Chimel’s original doctrine 
has remained unscathed in spaces that are not vehicles. As a result, home searches are 
easier to perform under search incident to arrest guidelines, despite having a greater 
privacy expectation than vehicles.  
Gant overturned Belton but did not stop there; it also restricted Chimel’s reach by 
compelling police procedure to follow a logical application of officer safety and evidence 
preservation. Rationally, evidence preservation and officer safety will not allow 
expansive searches. Chimel’s broad interpretation led to confusion because it makes no 
sense. Once the suspect has been patted down and handcuffed, there is a significant 
decrease in the probability they will be able to harm an officer or destroy evidence.  
Chimel had the right impulse as well as the correct conclusion, enforcing a greater 
level of privacy protection for American citizens. However, the means they undertook 
were soon revealed to be a fiction. By narrowing law enforcements reaching distance as 
the medium to increase privacy protection, the Courts opened a maelstrom of 
misinterpretation and abuse of their decision. The intent of the decision was quickly 
mutated by subsequent cases such as Belton. This article argues that the Court should 
have enacted greater privacy protection by instigating a narrow evidence gathering search 
instead of a narrowed reaching distance.  
Gant created doctrinal conflict when it corrected the original issue derived from a 
broad application of Chimel and restricted police scope in vehicular searches. Therefore, 
there are two options to rectify the doctrinal tension. Either overturn Gant and return to 
the broad adaptation of Chimel or make Gant’s decision widespread. Since Gant’s 
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justification is legitimate, this article proposes the best option is to further extend it into 
the home.  
This article contends that extending Gant’s evidence gathering rule into the home 
has firm justification founded in precedent, as well as correcting entangled doctrine. It 
will look at the implications of importing Gant into the home and the measures needed to 
ensure a smooth transition. 
Importing Gant’s restricted reach and evidence gathering into the home is the 
logical extension of modern search incident to arrest doctrine. It is necessary to unify the 
separate spheres in which it operates and rectify the anomaly of greater vehicular 
protection. Once the broader issue is resolved and vehicles have equal or less protection 
than homes, then the main concern becomes workability of extending Gant. It is illogical 
to import only half of a doctrine. Importing Gant’s restricted reaching rule is imperative 
to resolve the doctrinal tension. However, it must be followed by the importation of 
evidence gathering searches to prevent decreased crime control and protect police 
interests.  
There must be guidelines to ensure consistent police procedure and protect the 
privacy of the home. By constraining evidence gathering searches to the boundaries of a 
Bouie search and creating a digital device exception, police intrusion will be minimal. 
The policy and procedural impact make the changes logical, but the justification is in 
precedent. Chimel artificially narrowed common law and Gant’s revival of evidence 
gathering is simply returning to a time honored American tradition. 
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I. Fourth Amendment Reasonableness 
In order to study search incident to arrest law, one must first understand the 
surrounding legal context and possess a basic comprehension of the Fourth Amendment. 
This section will explore the fundamental definition of a search and seizure, what makes 
it reasonable, the requirements to conduct a search or seizure, necessary levels of 
information to obtain a warrant, and what happens if the Fourth Amendment is 
disregarded by law enforcement.  
The simple purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect American citizens 
from unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by law enforcement. However, the 
Fourth Amendment is more complicated than it first appears and has been controversial 
since its inception. As it states, 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.”  
The Fourth Amendment can be divided into four general segments. First, the 
people have a constitutionally recognized protection from searches and seizures. Second, 
this protection is only against unreasonable searches and seizures. Third, warrants are 
required to make a search or seizure reasonable. Fourth, warrants will not be issued 
unless there is probable cause to justify them. The amendment narrows as it is written, 
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providing a detailed layer of requirements for law enforcement. The Court holds 
Fourth Amendment protection in such high esteem that it enacted the punitive 
exclusionary rule, a measure to deny evidence that is the result of Fourth Amendment 
infractions. 
 
A.  Search and Seizure  
After recognizing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, it is imperative to 
understand when it is applicable. The Fourth Amendment has authority only in situations 
where police conduct can be classified as a search or seizure. If the police are not 
performing a search or seizure, one cannot claim their Fourth Amendment rights are 
being violated.  
A search involves a visual observation or physical intrusion that infringes upon a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy (Kyllo v United States). Where a seizure 
requires some meaningful interference with an individual’s liberty (an arrest) or 
possessory interests (a seizure of property) (Michigan v Chesternut). If neither of these 
two situations occur, the Fourth Amendment is irrelevant (Abramson 29). 
Searches are centered on privacy rights that can be subtly manipulated, whereas 
seizures are more concrete. A person is seized when they are physically or constructively 
taken into custody and detained, significantly depriving them of their freedom of 
movement. A person is not only seized when they are detained. A person can be 
considered seized if they are submitting to a show of authority and do not feel free to 
leave (Florida v Bostick). However, if a person is running from law enforcement and 
refuses to submit to their authority, they are not considered seized until the suspect is 
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subjected to physical force. If the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect, they are not 
seized and the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply until the suspect is 
apprehended (Abramson 30). 
Defining a search can be more complex than a seizure because of the ever-
changing constitutional jurisdiction. Modern Fourth Amendment interpretation is tethered 
to a person’s right to privacy, which is divided into a subjective or reasonably objective 
expectation for privacy. Throughout precedent, the Fourth Amendment has evolved from 
distinct “constitutionally protected” areas to a broader jurisdiction intended to protect 
general privacy expectations. Instead of protecting only the explicitly written variables 
(person, house, papers, and effects), the Fourth’s jurisdiction expanded to encompass a 
person’s right to privacy.  
The landmark case, Katz v United States, shifted the perception regarding the 
privacy rights afforded to citizens, and the spaces that qualify a search. Police 
electronically monitored Katz’s telephone conversation in a public phone booth. Katz 
motioned to have the evidence from his phone conversation suppressed, claiming it 
violated his Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable search (Katz 507). Until 
this case, the constitutionally protected areas that the Fourth Amendment applied to 
solely consisted of a man’s house, papers, person, and effects. All of which are tangible 
objects that the person has a legal right to protect and consider private.  
A phone booth does not fall under the constitutionally protected criteria, just as a 
conversation is not a tangible object that can be protected. However, the Court 
determined that the Fourth Amendment’s intent was to protect citizens from police 
intrusion in situations where the person could reasonably expect privacy. With the 
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development of electronic listening devices and other sense enhancing tools, the court 
had to reevaluate how far the Fourth Amendment’s protection extends. Courts decided 
the protection stretched much further than the literal wording of the Constitution. 
When the Court switched from constitutionally protected areas to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, it allowed the public phone booth to fall under the protection of 
the Fourth and greatly altered modern interpretation. This is significant because it 
legitimizes a person’s right to generalized privacy that is more inclusive than described in 
the text of the Constitution. If the person has a subjective expectation of privacy that is 
supported by a reasonable and objective expectation of privacy, then he is protected by 
the Fourth.  
There is an exception to Katz’s privacy expectation against police surveillance. If 
a suspect is talking to the police officer, even without knowledge they are law 
enforcement, and says something incriminating, it is admissible in court. The rationale is 
that a defendant cannot reasonably expect to be certain that the person with whom they 
are conversing is not an officer of the law. Once a defendant displaces his control over 
information, by discussing it with another party, he diminishes his expectation that the 
information is confidential (Abramson 30).  
While applying the Fourth Amendment to legal situations, it is imperative to 
remember the Fourth is only applicable if a search or seizure is made. Therefore, Fourth 
Amendment protection does not extend in situations where there is undercover law 
enforcement or a suspect is running from the police. These are a couple of the exceptions 
to search and seizure requirements. Mitigating warrant exceptions, all other search and 
seizures are controlled by the Fourth Amendment.  
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B. Reasonableness  
Once police action is qualified as a search, the next step is to determine whether 
the search is reasonable. Courts ascertain the reasonableness of a search by “evaluating 
the degree of intrusion on a person’s privacy and the extent to which the search is 
necessary to promote legitimate governmental interests” (Wyoming v Houghton). There is 
a balance between police interests and individual rights, with the balance favoring 
individuals if law enforcement is guilty of excessive intrusion into a person’s privacy 
(Abramson 29).  
Because of Katz’s role in the modern interpretation of the Fourth, what qualifies 
as excessive intrusion has to be re-evaluated in the face of privacy protection versus 
property protection. Excessive intrusion often involves sense-enhancing tools, such as 
listening devices that allow an officer to witness or hear more than he would normally be 
capable of. It is reasonable for a person to expect privacy if an officer could not gain 
access to information without the help of devices, instead of relying on his own abilities. 
However, a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy if they are conducting 
their business in plain sight or in a public place. A police officer has the right to witness 
what a normal citizen would be able to see or hear, and then react as a member of law 
enforcement (Abramson 36). 
Because of the decision to extend Fourth Amendment protection, there are 
varying expectations of privacy for people and their possessions. Aligning with the 
Fourth, an American citizen has the greatest expectation of privacy in their house. 
However, this expectation of privacy exceeds the simple physical boundaries of the 
constitutionally protected home.  
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There is more to a search than walking through the front door and examining the 
suspect’s possessions. If law enforcement does not have a warrant, it is illegal to use 
sense-enhancing devices to determine what is happening within the confines of the home. 
This includes listening devices, recording devices, and heat sensors. Without a warrant, it 
is unreasonable for police to search the home, even if they never actually cross the 
threshold. 
The home is a man’s castle, and has routinely possessed the greatest constitutional 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Stringent legal protections restrict 
home intrusion. A warrant is required to enter a man’s house and conduct a search, in the 
exception of an in home arrest. An arrest warrant is required to arrest someone in their 
own home, barring exigent circumstances. The evolution of the Fourth Amendment from 
property protection to privacy protection resulted in litigation to create a template for law 
enforcement to follow during searches and seizures. 
During litigation, the most contentious issue is the definition of “unreasonable.” 
What constitutes a reasonable search and seizure? Is it the presence of a warrant issued 
by a judge or magistrate? Because of varying expectations of privacy, there is a spectrum 
of reasonableness. Vehicles and homes have different expectations; therefore, there are 
different required levels of reasonableness for each space. 
 
C. Warrants and Warrant Exceptions 
In most situations, a home or vehicular search is only considered reasonable in the 
presence of a warrant. Search warrants are based on probable cause and give the police 
access to the entire home, with the ability to seize fruits or evidences of a crime. The 
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purpose of a search warrant is to incorporate a neutral judge as a third party who can 
objectively determine whether the intrusion is justified. Searches conducted without a 
warrant approved by a judge or magistrate are inherently unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment (Abramson 39).  
Warrants allow expansive searches but there are many situations in which law 
enforcement is able to reasonably conduct a search without providing a warrant. The list 
of exceptions includes: exigent circumstances, consent searches, plain view searches, 
stop and frisk searches, the automobile warrant exception, inventory searches, and search 
incident to lawful arrest.  
Exigent circumstances are classified by concern for imminent destruction of 
evidence, risk of danger to police or others, or hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. Consent 
searches are when the suspect waives his Fourth Amendment rights. Plain view exception 
is very common; when an officer is in a place he has a right to be and sees illegal activity 
or contraband he has the right to seize items that are in his “plain view.”  
Stop and frisk searches are a temporary seizure of a person with the intent to 
clarify an ambiguous situation in which the officer has objective and subjective reason to 
believe a person may be armed and dangerous or criminal activity is occurring. The 
automobile exception allows police to search a car if they suspect to discover the fruits, 
instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime within the vehicle. This warrant exception 
comes from the exigent nature of vehicular mobility. Inventory searches are known as 
“booking searches” in which the police station searches and catalogues the personal 
effects of a person under lawful arrest as a part of routine administrative procedure 
(Abramson 53-89).  
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Law enforcement frequently uses all of these exceptions, but this article focuses 
on warrantless search incident to arrest. Once a person is lawfully arrested, police are not 
required to procure a search warrant to search the arrestee’s person or the area incident to 
his arrest. The nature of the arrest allows for a warrantless search. An arrest warrant is 
required to arrest a person within their home. The only exception to an arrest warrant is 
the presence of exigent circumstances, such as a fleeing criminal.  
This means that if a person is arrested in his home, with an arrest warrant, police 
are allowed to search the home incident to his arrest despite the absence of a search 
warrant. Being legally arrested diminishes the defendant’s expectation to privacy and 
allows for a warrantless search incident to arrest. If a person is not arrested in their home, 
then neither an arrest warrant nor a search warrant is required to conduct a search. If a 
person is in a public setting or in a vehicle, the police are allowed to search incident to a 
lawful arrest without any type of warrant.  
The Fourth Amendment is meant to protect citizens from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by employing warrants and detailed warrant exceptions. Broad warrant 
exceptions are dangerous because they can be interpreted in a way that infringes on 
people’s rights. Because of that, there are clear boundaries and requirements that must be 
present for the police to institute a search incident to arrest. The search must be 
contemporaneous to the arrest and within the area of “immediate control” to the arrestee. 
Temporal and spatial requirements prevent abuse of this warrant exception (Abramson 
56). 
There are three justifications to reasonably search a person who has been lawfully 
arrested; 1) to make sure he does not have a weapon on his person or within reach, 2) to 
15 
prevent the destruction of evidence, 3) to discover evidence of the crime he has 
committed, or to find the fruits of the committed crime. Officer safety, evidence 
preservation, and discovering probative evidence are all critical to enhancing crime 
control and safety in the field (Abramson 56). 
 
D. Probable Cause  
The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for issuance of a search warrant 
or an arrest warrant (Abramson 39). Probable cause is based on the totality of the 
circumstances, how incriminating information is obtained, and the credibility of 
informants. Probable cause is determined reasonable or unreasonable based on the 
information law enforcement has before the arrest is made. Any information revealed 
post warrant is irrelevant to the reasonableness of the warrant. 
Information derived from other police officers, informants, anonymous tipsters, 
and private citizens establish probable cause. A judge must make a “common sense 
decision” based on the information garnered from different sources. The common sense 
is based on the totality of the circumstances. Probable cause does not require rigid 
categories of proof but is dependent on the reliability of information.  
For example, a citizen’s information may be more credible than an informant’s. 
The government has a two-prong test when determining the reliability of an informant; 
how the informant obtained his information and why the informant is reliable (Abramson 
40). These prongs are often called the underlying circumstances prong and the credibility 
prong (Abramson 40). 
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To issue an arrest warrant the government must prove that there is a “fair 
probability” that a crime has been committed and the person they are arresting committed 
the crime. Without an exigent circumstance, an arrest warrant is required for law 
enforcement to arrest someone in his home.  
To issue a search warrant, the government must be able to demonstrate a fair 
probability that the government is searching for specific items that are evidence of 
criminal activity and that those items are presently located at the specified place 
described by the warrant (Abramson 40). Fair probability is determined with a common 
sense approach by the judge or magistrate. If it is reasonably inferable, the police will 
most likely acquire the capabilities to search a person’s home or arrest them in their 
home. 
If law enforcement enters a person’s home without a warrant to either arrest or 
search, anything seized in the house is inadmissible in a court of law. While it is legal to 
search without a search warrant in the presence of an arrest warrant, the search does not 
extend to the entire home. The police can only search the areas within immediate control 
of the arrestee. If there is a search warrant, police are allowed to search within the 
parameters of the issued warrant, which could be the entire home. 
Because of the importance placed on a man’s home in the Fourth Amendment, the 
only time law enforcement can enter a home without some form of warrant is under 
exigent circumstances. For example, if the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect or they 
believe there is an injured person inside the home. If there are not exigent circumstances, 
the police must have a search or arrest warrant to gain entry into the home or any 
evidence gathered is inadmissible. 
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E. Exclusionary Rule 
The exclusionary rule prohibits prosecutors from using evidence that was 
obtained in violation of a person’s Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment rights (Abramson 
9). In the case of Fourth Amendment violations, excluding evidence that came from an 
illegal search or seizure is meant to act as a deterrent against police misconduct. The 
exclusionary rule is used as a constitutional remedy to ensure every person is afforded 
their Fourth Amendment rights to privacy.  
The cost of the exclusionary rule is a loss of evidence and the potential that a 
criminal goes free as a result of a law enforcement mistake. Often the law enforcement 
mistake is made at the magistrate level. If the warrant was not reasonable or was the 
product of judicial oversight, there is no need to deter police officers because the 
Constitutional infraction is not their doing. When a defendant motions to remove 
evidence from a trial based on a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, he is calling into 
effect the exclusionary rule. However, there is a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule that allows for police mistakes but not misconduct.  
The exclusionary rule does not apply “where a law enforcement officer has acted 
in reasonable “good faith” on the basis of an unconstitutional search warrant” (Abramson 
15). Not employing the exclusionary rule in this instance means that an officer’s reliance 
on an invalid search warrant will not negate the evidence found during the search. 
However, if the officer should be concerned about the validity of the warrant, say he saw 
the magistrate sign a warrant without reading it, then he can not claim he acted in good 
faith and the exclusionary rule will apply. 
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II. Search Incident to Arrest 
This section gives a brief overview of search incident to arrest doctrine and 
history. It details the requirements to perform a search incident to arrest, as well as the 
different categories of privacy protection that exist in the doctrine. It also looks at the two 
eras of search incident to arrest doctrine and distinguishes them into cases that support an 
earlier evidence gathering capability versus modern cases that place importance reaching 
distance rules.  
Legal arrest is necessary for law enforcement to implement a search incident to 
arrest. A “legal” arrest occurs when the police take a suspect into custody in order to 
bring charges (Abramson 55). A citation or summons to court does not qualify as an 
arrest and does not justify a search. 
Search incident to legal arrest has three categories; an arrest in a public place, an 
arrest in a suspect’s home, and arrest in a vehicle. Each of these categories has a varying 
level of expected privacy and protection. An arrest made in a public place is the least 
protected, then vehicular arrest, then an arrest made in a home.  
In a public setting, the additional complication of searching a space the arrestee 
has constitutional rights to, such as his vehicle or home, is absent. It is common law that 
police are capable of arresting a person in a public place without an arrest warrant. There 
must be probable cause that the suspect has committed a felony to justify a public arrest, 
but that is the only requirement. 
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Chimel’s doctrine controls home arrests. The area within immediate control of the 
arrestee determines the reaching distance of the police officer. Chimel home searches are 
carried out to prevent the danger to the police officer and destruction of evidence. 
Officers are looking for weapons and evidence that the arrestee could destroy. Articulable 
fear of danger to the officer or evidence is not required, despite these being the only two 
reasons to conduct a search.  
Gant’s doctrine controls vehicular searches. Officer’s reach is dependent on 
Chimel’s rules; however, articulable fear is mandatory to implement the search. 
Translated, an officer’s reaching distance is extremely restricted in vehicles. Homes do 
not require articulable fear for officer danger or evidence preservation but vehicles do. To 
balance this constraint Gant incorporated evidence gathering into vehicular searches as a 
way to offset the restricted reaching distance.  
A search incident to arrest is reasonable because the arrestee might have a weapon 
on his person or within reach that can endanger law enforcement or be used to effect an 
escape, or there may be incriminating evidence that he can destroy. Officer safety and 
evidence preservation are the two rationales that justify searching without a warrant. 
Temporal and spatial dimensions are required components of search incident to 
arrests. The search must be relatively contemporaneous to the arrest as well as within the 
“immediate control” of the arrestee. These components place boundaries around the 
warrant exception to protect defendants from potential abuse of the exception. A police 
officer may search closed containers on the person, containers immediately associated 
with the arrestee, and containers within their immediate control.  
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In practice, this means that law enforcement cannot arrest someone in a room and 
come back two hours later to search it. It also means that once a person is arrested, the 
officer is able to search containers such as purses, closed cigarette containers on the 
person, or any type of container that is in proximity to the arrestee.  
 
A. Early Era Evidence Gathering  
It was understood in early American case law that law enforcement had the 
capability to search for evidence of the crime. Common law practices that date back to 
England are clear that evidence gathering was a common and accepted practice. Justice 
Alito reveals that when pre-Weeks authorities discussed search incident to arrest, their 
main basis for the rule was the collection of “probative evidence.” Officer safety and 
evidence preservation cannot be the only reasons to search a person following an arrest if 
the central focus used to be on collecting evidence for prosecution 
J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure (1872) states  
“If an arresting officer finds about the prisoner’s person, or otherwise in 
his possession, either goods or moneys which there is reason to believe are 
connected with the supposed crime as its fruits, or as the instruments with 
which it was committed, or as directly furnishing evidence relating to the 
transaction, he may take the same, and hold them to be disposed of as the 
court may direct.” 
Bishop’s description is important because it breaks down the three acceptable 
types of items that can be seized. Two of the three types are present in modern search 
incident to arrest doctrine, but the other is the source of contention. Officers can seize: 
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fruits of the crime (material objects acquired in a criminal act), the instruments with 
which a crime was committed (for example, a gun or lock picking kit), or directly 
furnishing evidence relating to the transaction (for example, clothing that a suspect was 
seen wearing while robbing a store).  
 
i. Weeks v United States (1914) 
Weeks v United States established that precedent uniformly maintains that a police 
officer has the right to search incident to arrest. Weeks was arrested, without warrant, for 
using the mails to transport lottery tickets. An officer arrested him at his work place in 
the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri. While he was being arrested at his place of 
employment, officers went to his home, found the key and searched his room.  
They seized papers and other articles found there, then turned them over to the 
United States marshal. The marshal returned to Week’s home hours later to conduct his 
own search, he was admitted into the house by a boarder, and left with more letters from 
the defendant’s room. Weeks petitioned to have his property returned to him, but the 
Court returned only materials impertinent to the case and retained evidence that could be 
used to assign guilt.  
The Court decided that all of the evidence found in Mr. Weeks room had to be 
returned and could not be used in the trial. Justice Day’s opinion expressly stated that the 
judgment was not negating the authority of search incident to arrest; they did not decide 
the case based on that right. The absence of legitimate search incident to arrest allowed 
for Justice Day to clarify the requirements constituting a reasonable search incident to 
arrest. 
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The first component is spatial; law enforcement cannot search a man’s home 
under the guise of “search incident to arrest” if they did not arrest him there. The only 
legal way a police officer may enter a home, without being allowed in, is with the 
presence of an arrest or search warrant, neither of which the police had. 
There is also a temporal aspect; had Mr. Weeks been arrested in his home and a 
search made, the United States Marshall still could not have returned hours later to 
conduct another search. The search must be contemporaneous to the arrest to be 
considered a search incident to arrest. Searches must be made in the area under the 
arrestee’s “immediate control” and must be done in a timely fashion. The two 
determining qualities are whether the search is made in the space of the arrest and if it is 
made in a timely manner. 
 
ii. United States v Rabinowitz (1950) 
In United States v Rabinowitz, the Court determined the police were allowed to 
search Mr. Rabinowitz’s office incident to his arrest, without a search warrant, even 
though they had time to procure one. Rabinowitz was convicted of selling and of 
possessing and concealing forged and altered United States stamps with the intent to 
defraud. Mr. Rabinowitz was a repeat offender and possessed a plate used to overprint 
Government postage stamps. 
Knowing that Rabinowitz was a repeat offender, and that there was reliable 
information that he possessed several thousand altered stamps bearing forged overprints, 
the police obtained a warrant for Mr. Rabinowitz’s arrest. They went to his place of 
business with two stamp experts and, against his objections, searched his desk, safe, and 
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file cabinets. Police found and seized 573 forged stamps. They did not have a search 
warrant, despite clear intention to conduct a search.  
Rabinowitz motioned to suppress evidence pertaining to the 573 stamps that he 
claimed were illegally seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court 
expressed that “No one questions the right, without a search warrant, to search the person 
after a valid arrest” (Rabinowitz 432). Regardless of the dual purpose to arrest and 
search, the only required warrant is for an arrest. The right for law enforcement to search 
a person incident to their arrest has always been recognized in the United States and 
England. Rabinowitz maintains the firm foundation of search incident to arrest in 
American common law. 
The search is valid because of the arrest, but the next ambiguity the Court clarifies 
is the scope allowed to the police. There is no doubt that officers are allowed a lawful 
search to detect weapons or that police are allowed to seize fruits of the crime or the 
means by which it was committed. The Court references an earlier decision Agnello v 
United States,  
The right to ‘search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and 
seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by 
which it was committed’ seems to have stemmed not only from the 
acknowledged authority to search the person, but also from the 
longstanding practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the 
control of the accused found upon arrest (433). 
However, it is also recognized that the police look for evidence of the crime while 
searching a defendant incident to arrest. It is a “longstanding practice” to search the 
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accused for evidence of the crime, not for the purpose of officer safety or evidence 
preservation. 
 
B. Modern Era: Reaching Distance Rules 
Modern reaching distance rules that have been the standard for homes and 
vehicles since 1969 and 1981, respectively, are derived from Chimel v California and 
New York v Belton. In Chimel, the police are allowed to search the arrestee and the area 
within the defendant’s “immediate control”. The justification behind this search is to find 
weapons that could endanger the officer or evidence that the suspect could destroy.  
In 1981, Belton broadened the scope of Chimel and expanded the reaching 
distance allowed in vehicular searches. Police are allowed to search the entire car (minus 
trunk), the passenger compartment, and all containers within the vehicle. Police are also 
allowed to remove the arrestee from the scene of the crime and return to search after the 
fact. Belton claims the same two justifications as Chimel, but created a bright-line rule 
meant to be easier for police to follow and remove perverse incentives for police to leave 
potentially dangerous suspects near the area they want to search. 
Neither Chimel nor Belton require officers to articulate a reasonable fear for his 
safety or the safety of the evidence. Both claim the situation is inherently dangerous and 
searches are always justified based on officer protection and evidence preservation. This 
seems like a reach in the face of Belton’s lenient approach to Chimel. 
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i. Officer Safety and Evidence Gathering: Chimel v California (1969) 
Chimel v California altered the justification behind search incident to arrest 
doctrine by instigating a two-prong rationale of officer safety and evidence preservation 
to explain the purpose of the searches. Officers came to Chimel’s home with a warrant 
for his arrest, but no search warrant. They proceeded to search his entire home, including 
small containers, under the justification that they were allowed to search incident to 
Chimel’s arrest. The search lasted around an hour and the officers gathered evidence that 
was used in Chimel’s trial. Chimel motioned that the evidence be suppressed under a 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  
The Supreme Court’s opinion held that “warrantless search of defendant’s entire 
house, incident to defendant’s proper arrest in house on burglary charge, was 
unreasonable as extending beyond defendant’s person and area from which he might have 
obtained either weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him” 
(Chimel 2034).  
This decision was made to legitimately narrow the scope of the police and set 
definite rules regarding the spaces available to police search. To do this the Court created 
twin rationales that the police must adhere to. There must be a threat to officer safety or 
the possibility an arrestee is able to destroy evidence. 
Both rationales logically allow for the police to search the person as well as the 
area “within the arrestee’s immediate control.” The confusion came once people began to 
debate what constitutes “immediate control” of the arrestee. Without a clear definition of 
the available space for police to search, there was individual litigation determining the 
permissible area beyond the arrestee that a search can cover. 
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ii. Robinson v United States (1973)  
In Robinson v United States the police officer made a full custodial arrest because 
Robinson was driving with a revoked license. Once the arrest was made, the officer 
searched Robinson’s person and found a crumpled cigarette carton, which he opened and 
found heroin. Robinson motioned to suppress the heroin under the claim that the officer’s 
search exceeded its bounds once he ascertained that there was not a weapon.   
The Court of Appeals suppressed the evidence under the reasoning that the officer 
would be unable to find evidence of a revoked license, the offense for which the 
respondent was charged, therefore the frisk of the arrestee should take on the qualities of 
a Terry frisk. The Supreme Court overturned their decision because they claim it is 
unnecessary for there to be case-by-case adjucation regarding law enforcement’s reasons 
behind a search. The valid arrest is reason enough. The Court explains, 
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, 
while based upon the need to disarm and discover evidence, does not 
depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular 
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would, in fact, be found upon the 
person of the suspect (477). 
Once a lawful arrest is made, the officer is allowed to search the arrestee. During 
a lawful search, the officer was entitled to inspect the cigarette carton and once he found 
the heroin, he was entitled to seize it as “fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband” 
probative of criminal conduct.  
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This is significant because the Court is saying that Robinson’s search is 
reasonable, despite the lack of concern over Chimel’s two policy reasons. There was no 
concern over loss of evidence or the danger of a weapon. The frisk revealed no weapons 
and there would be no further evidence of a revoked license on the person being 
searched. This decision kept the requirements to search incident to arrest extremely broad 
by and further removed from the Court’s two justifications. 
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III. Vehicular Search Incident to Arrest 
This section will discuss New York v Belton’s bright line approach to search 
incident to arrest and Gant’s subsequent modification of Belton’s rule with the 
superseding restricted reaching distance and evidence gathering rules. 
Until the Belton decision in 1981, vehicles were considered in the same category 
as homes, and fell under Chimel’s doctrine. However, from 1981 to 2009 police 
enforcement has operated under a bright-line rule that always allows law enforcement to 
search the inside of a vehicle (minus trunk), the passenger compartment, and all 
containers within the car. Belton overrides the “immediate control” scope of Chimel. This 
decision was made for simplicity and continuity in the field, but had a far more reaching 
consequence than intended.   
 
A. Bright Line Reaching Distance Rules Belies False Search Justifications: 
New York v Belton (1981) 
New York v Belton was a Supreme Court case that implemented a user-friendly 
version of Chimel v California. Roger Belton was pulled over for speeding, during their 
interaction after the stop, the police officer smelt burning marijuana and saw an envelope 
that he suspected contained marijuana. The officer arrested Belton and the other 
passengers of the car. After their arrest, the officer searched the passenger compartment 
of the car and a zipped jacket pocket in which he found cocaine. Belton motioned to 
29 
suppress the cocaine found in the jacket, claiming it violated the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  
The Supreme Court denied Belton’s motion to suppress evidence on the grounds 
that Chimel v California held,  
The lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the 
contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person arrested and of 
the immediately surrounding area. Such searches have long been 
considered valid because of the need to ‘remove any weapons that [the 
arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape’ and 
the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence (Belton 
2862). 
Chimel’s decision was meant to create a standard, easily applicable, and 
“predictably enforced” rule for police to follow in the field; an officer may reasonably 
search a person and the area incident to a lawful custodial arrest. However, the intended 
simplification failed because it was too broad. This created a necessity for Belton to 
explicitly define the available scope of law enforcement.  
Chimel did not offer a straightforward rule, as evidenced by the amount of 
subsequent litigation. It established that a search incident to arrest may not exceed the 
space within the “immediate control of the arrestee” but that statement is too general. In a 
theoretical sense, the court could be reduced to measuring a suspect’s wingspan. 
The Court balanced privacy interests with law enforcement interests and 
determined it was appropriate to sacrifice privacy to ensure a rule is predictably 
enforceable.  The purpose was to prevent unnecessary litigation trying to define reaching 
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distance. Belton also wanted to prevent fostering bad incentives for police to generate 
dangerous situations to gain access to search a crime scene.  
Following the continuity of the Court’s simplification process, Belton created a 
bright-line rule that allowed police to search the interior of a vehicle, its passenger 
compartment, and all containers within the body of the car (excluding the trunk). Law 
enforcement are awarded this search even once the arrestee has been arrested, 
handcuffed, and removed from the immediate scene of the crime.  
However, the bright-line rule intended to simplify Chimel, revealed the false 
justifications the Court used to allow searches. The reason for Chimel is either officer 
safety or evidence preservation, but Belton makes those two rationales completely 
arbitrary. Belton’s motion to suppress evidence is denied because of the Chimel 
reasoning, but within its own determination Belton completely disregards the intended 
purpose of Chimel. 
 
B. Newly Restricted Reaching Distance Rule and Reintroduced Evidence 
Gathering: Arizona v Gant (2009) 
Arizona v Gant overturned Belton and reevaluated the purpose of Chimel. 
Belton’s disregard of the temporal and spatial components of Chimel illustrated the 
inappropriate application of search incident to arrest, which then highlighted the lenient 
approach towards Chimel’s twin rationales. Gant recognized that it was unlikely for the 
purpose of the search to be officer safety or evidence preservation if the suspect was 
restrained in a squad car. Chimel’s justifications are valid, both are important reasons to 
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search following an arrest. However, if law enforcement performs searches based only on 
those two rationales, there would be far fewer searches available to the police. 
Officers were responding to an anonymous tip that drugs were being sold out of a 
home when they knocked on the front door and Gant answered. After they left, the 
officers did a records search and saw that Gant had an outstanding arrest warrant for 
driving with a suspended license. They returned to the house and arrested two other 
people for drug charges when Gant drove up the driveway. Gant was then arrested for 
driving a car with a suspended license and handcuffed. The two other arrestees were in 
the squad car so the arresting officer waited for backup, then placed Gant in a squad car 
as well. Once all three people were handcuffed and removed from the scene, the officers 
searched Gant’s car which contained a gun and a bag of cocaine. Gant was charged with 
possessing drugs to sell and paraphernalia. Gant motioned the Court to have the narcotics 
suppressed, claiming his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated when the police 
searched the vehicle.  
Gant argued that his situation did not fall under Belton’s jurisdiction because of 
two reasons. First, Gant was not a threat to the officers once he was handcuffed and 
placed in the patrol car. Second, there was no need to search the vehicle to find evidence 
of a suspended license. The scenario seems obvious; Gant was connected to a drug racket 
and the officers were likely hoping to find evidence of narcotics. The Court evaluated 
Gant’s argument and recognized its validity. The opinion states,  
When ‘the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the 
scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a 
patrol car, and under the supervision of an officer,’ the court concluded, a 
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“warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary to 
protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence” 
(Gant 1716).  
Because of Belton’s time of arrest doctrine and spatial bright line rule, the police 
legally searched Gant’s vehicle. However, the Court reexamined Belton’s justifications 
and decided to narrow its reach “Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches 
incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and 
it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis” 
(Gant 1721). The Court determined that the search of Gant’s car was unconstitutional 
because Gant could not have reached a weapon or evidence within his vehicle,  
This Court rejects a broad reading of Belton that would permit a vehicle 
search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest even if there were no 
possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the 
search. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel’s 
authorize a vehicle search only when there is a reasonable possibility of 
such access (Gant 1713). 
Once the Court overturned Belton for exceeding the justifications set by Chimel, 
they reevaluated the original intent of Chimel. They saw that the rationale used to 
conduct most searches was being overextended. To combat the overuse of Chimel, the 
Court placed heavy restrictions on when its two rationales can be used to justify a search 
incident to arrest. Gant restricted Chimel’s reaching distance rule but reintroduced 
evidence gathering to offset the limitation.  
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The Gant court determined that vehicles get the additional evidence gathering 
justification in search incident to arrest. Even if there is no threat to the officer’s safety or 
evidence preservation, if the police believe there is a reasonable suspicion that evidence 
of the crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle they have the right to conduct a search. 
Despite this addition to vehicular search incident to arrest policy, Gant fails both 
requirements needed for police intrusion. Gant was not within reach of his vehicle and 
there is no reason for officers to search his vehicle for evidence of a suspended license. 
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IV. No Extension of Evidence Gathering Search to Digital Devices: Riley v 
California (2014) 
This section will discuss an important constraint on evidence gathering, digital 
data exceptions. Riley established that a cellular device does not fall under the umbrella 
of search incident to arrest. Law enforcement must obtain a warrant to search a cell phone 
because of the vast quantities of information it stores. The facts of Riley are simple, 
digital data is too expansive to search without a warrant and cannot be examined, even 
under Gant’s evidence gathering prong. 
Riley was convicted on a weapons charge after being arrested for a traffic 
violation. In the search incident to his arrest, the officer searched Riley’s person and took 
his cell phone from his pocket. Riley’s phone was a “smart phone” with advanced 
computing, large amounts of storage and Internet capabilities (Riley 2480). Photos, 
contacts, videos, emails, and text messages are a few examples of available information 
that could be accessed off of a smart phone.  
The officer read the information on the phone and noticed suspicious material. 
There were multiple mentions of a term associated with the “Blood” street gang. He 
noticed that some words, either in messages or contacts, were preceded with the letters 
“CK.” This created more suspicion because “CK” is a common moniker for Crips Killer. 
Hours after Riley’s arrest, a detective who specialized in gangs, further examined the 
phone’s content.  
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The detective testified that he searched Riley’s phone “looking for evidence, 
because gang members will often video themselves with guns or take pictures of 
themselves with guns” (Riley 2480-2481). While there were many interesting things 
found on Riley’s phone, the most incriminating piece of evidence was a photo. Riley was 
pictured in front of a car that had been involved with a shooting a few weeks earlier. The 
information garnered from the phone connected Riley to this previous crime.  
With evidence gained from the cellular device, Riley was charged and convicted 
of firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted 
murder. The State also argued that Riley committed these crimes for a criminal street 
gang, which resulted in an enhanced sentence of fifteen years.  Riley motioned to 
suppress the evidence retrieved from his phone, claiming the search violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights because there was no exigent circumstance to justify searching the 
phone without a warrant.   
Following the decisions in Chimel and Robinson, the Court would allow police to 
search a cell phone found within the immediate control of the arrestee. Chimel gave the 
two reasons justifying search incident to arrest; officer safety and evidence preservation. 
Then Robinson declared that the “two risks identified by Chimel are present in all 
custodial arrests” (Riley 2482-2485). This means there does not need to be an articulable 
fear because all searches incident to arrest are inherently dangerous. This logic was used 
in People v Diaz (2011) in which the court held that the Fourth Amendment allowed 
warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest, as long as the phone is immediately 
associated with the arrested person. However, if the Court uses the same reasoning as 
Gant, it is clear that digital searches fail Chimel’s two rationales. There is no way a 
36 
digital search will reveal a weapon and there is not enough risk of evidence destruction to 
do anything beyond seize the phone. The only reason to search a phone is to uncover the 
evidence hidden within its data.  
A person’s expectations to privacy are diminished once they are arrested. 
However, cell phones with the capabilities of the modern smart phone were not written in 
the nation’s fabric when Chimel and Robinson were decided. Diaz followed the standard 
set by those two decisions, just as Riley did in the Court of Appeals by upholding the 
cellular search.    
In the case of Robinson, the pat down and inspection of the cigarette pack only 
added, “minor additional intrusions,” unlike the examination of a cell phone. The storage 
capacity of modern cell phones creates a weightier privacy concern.  Because of the vast 
quantities of personal information that can be stored on phones, the Court determined that 
officers must secure a warrant before searching. The massive privacy intrusion combined 
with Riley’s failure to withhold the scrutiny of Chimel’s twin rationales mean that there is 
no valid justification to allow law enforcement warrantless digital data searches. The 
resurgence trend of evidence gathering was stopped at searching cellular devices.  
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V. Why Courts Should Import Arizona v Gant Search Incident to Arrest 
Rules into the Home 
This article contends that the two Arizona v Gant search incident to arrest prongs, 
evidence gathering and restricted reaching distance, should be imported into the home. 
There are four reasons to import both rules into the home, as opposed to constraining 
them to vehicular searches. First, this approach would cure the doctrinal disconnect 
between the scope of searches available in vehicles and homes. Second, importing only 
Gant’s restricted reaching distance prong without the evidence-gathering prong will result 
in a loss of crime control and create perverse incentives for law enforcement to 
manipulate the reaching distance rule by engaging in dangerous conduct. Third, there are 
historical justifications and earlier case law legitimizing evidence gathering as a grounds 
to search in homes. Lastly, this approach promotes an ease of administration with concise 
rules pertaining to both vehicles and homes. 
 
A. Curing the Anomaly: Vehicles have more Privacy Protection than 
Homes 
Doctrinal reconciliation is important for search incident to arrest policy because it 
harmonizes the two doctrines that began the anomaly of homes possessing less privacy 
protection than vehicles. This is not an abstract need for symmetry; there is a policy 
conflict that disregards varying levels of Constitutional protection. Vehicles and homes 
have two opposing doctrines detailing the range of law enforcement’s reaching distance. 
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The difficulty with having two doctrines, other than general confusion, is that they 
are inversely assigned relative to privacy expectations of the home and vehicle  
Reconciling the two doctrines will mean having a single standard for both areas. 
Retaining opposing doctrines is only reasonable if the difference between homes and 
vehicles is too expansive to reconcile. However, the doctrines are reconcilable because 
Gant narrowed the difference between the privacy expectations of vehicle and home by 
instigating a strong precedent for vehicular privacy. The two spaces are no longer 
distinctive enough to warrant opposing doctrines, especially doctrines that are incorrectly 
classified.  
Courts need to import Gant’s restrictive reaching distance rule into the home to 
avoid the anomaly of providing greater privacy protection to vehicles than homes. The 
home claims the greatest expectation of privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment, yet 
it has less protection from police intrusion than vehicles. This is a contradiction between 
legal expectation and the reality of law enforcement.  
Cars possess less privacy protection than homes because of the exigency derived 
from mobility and diminished expectation of privacy. Diminished expectation of privacy 
requires that a vehicle must be “readily mobile” and subjected to the regulations 
associated with vehicles (Abramson 62). This includes cars, other transport vehicles, and 
mobile homes that are considered readily mobile. 
Chimel advocates police intrusion because of its wide interpretation in lower 
courts. Gant, on the other hand, is much more restrictive to law enforcement. In Chimel, 
law enforcement is always able to search the arrestee’s person and the area within the 
immediate control of the arrestee at the time of the arrest. In Gant, police are only able to 
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search the vehicle if there is a reasonable possibility of access to a weapon or evidence. 
Chimel and Gant differ on one major point, the time of arrest guideline to searching. 
Chimel allows searches of an area the arrestee could have reached at the time of arrest 
whereas Gant does not allow that expansive access.  
The Chimel rule is the current standard for home searches, giving police more 
opportunities to conduct warrantless searches. Chimel allows broad searches for the 
purpose of officer safety and preservation of evidence. It is an automatic search; the 
officer is not required to articulate a reasonable fear for their safety or evidence 
destruction. For example, they are allowed to search the area within the immediate 
control of the arrestee after it is no longer in the arrestee’s immediate control. The 
arrestee could be handcuffed and in the police car, but the police would still retain the 
right to search based on the two Chimel rationales.  
The Gant rule is the current standard for vehicles and utilizes a tailored 
interpretation of Chimel, despite a vehicle’s diminished expectation of privacy. To search 
the inside of a vehicle the police must be able to articulate a reasonable fear for their 
safety or destruction of evidence, but law enforcement is not held to that stringent 
standard when searching a home. For example, once the arrestee is handcuffed and 
removed from the scene, law enforcement is not allowed to use the Chimel rules to justify 
a search of the vehicle.  
When looking at the search incident to arrest doctrinal issue, it is clear that the 
answer cannot be a more aggressive reaching distance rule for vehicles than that of 
homes. The doctrines must be fixed because the current reaching distance rules 
anomalously afford more privacy protection for vehicles than homes, and that is 
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nonsensical. Either vehicles and homes have equal privacy protection or vehicles have 
less; there is no legitimate reason or expectation for vehicles to have more protection than 
homes.  
To reconcile these two opposing doctrines, courts have two options; they either 
overrule Gant or Chimel. The reasoning behind the Gant decision is sound. Chimel 
placed a false label of police protection and evidence preservation to produce a politically 
correct rationalization for the scope of searches. Creating palatable doctrine does not 
validate inverting expected privacy protection. Gant overturned the use of Chimel’s 
doctrine for vehicular searches because it was incorrectly justified.  
On the rare instance that the officer is unable to secure the scene, he is focused on 
controlling the unsecured suspect, not searching the vehicle for evidence. In most 
situations, the officer is able to secure the scene of the crime, so their safety is not in 
question once the search begins. The recurring exigency of destruction of evidence is in 
the same vein as officer safety; the suspect is typically in lawful custody and unable to 
access the vehicle and evidence within it. 
Logically, if the arrested suspect is handcuffed and detained in the back of a 
squad car, they are unable to reach a weapon or destroy evidence following the search of 
their person. However, under the twin rationales of Chimel, law enforcement has the 
authority to search the inside of the vehicle, all containers within, and the passenger 
compartment despite the absence of real danger. This creates an obvious tension between 
what Chimel intended and its actual application. 
Justice Alito explicitly explains his doubt of the twin Chimel rationales in his 
Riley v. California concurrence, “I am not convinced at this time that the ancient rule on 
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searches incident to arrest is based exclusively (or even primarily) on the need to protect 
the safety of arresting officers and the need to prevent the destruction of evidence” (Riley 
2495).  
Because of incorrect application of the Chimel decision, the courts should 
overturn its current standard in the home and adopt Gant’s vehicular restricted reaching 
distance rule. The Gant ruling specifically narrowed the police’s reaching distance to 
return law enforcement practices to the intended purposes of Chimel. Chimel’s decision, 
the nexus of search incident to arrest doctrine, is not tethered to vehicles, so it follows 
that Gant’s return to Chimel would also not be restricted to vehicles.  
To combat the resulting loss of crime control, Gant reinstated the historic 
common law evidence-gathering search. Gant’s creation of a more protective system 
against police intrusion would be too severe if there was not another component to 
protect law enforcement’s interests as well. In the Court’s opinion of Gant, Justice 
Stevens wrote in agreement with Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence,  
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude that 
circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a 
lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the 
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle (Gant 1714).  
Previous searches were justified using Chimel’s rationales, but the Gant court 
recognized the true purpose is to discover evidence of criminal activity. Disconnect 
between police procedure and police justification led to reevaluating the mislabeled law 
enforcement. Once the purpose of the searches is admitted, courts gain the ability to 
monitor and regulate evidence gathering as a tool available to the police.  
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The dual rules of vehicular restricted reaching and evidence gathering ensure 
greater accountability from law enforcement without infringing on their crime control 
interests. Without operating under both prongs, vehicular searches would be few and far 
between. It is necessary to have the dual prongs for a workable vehicular doctrine, just as 
it was necessary to restrict the reaching distance. 
Because of the same faulty justification that led to overturning Chimel in vehicles, 
the courts need to overturn Chimel for the home to prevent tension and illogical doctrine. 
Once it is apparent that the restrictive reaching distance rule should be imported into the 
home, the rest of Gant’s decision must be examined. In vehicular searches the restriction 
on reaching distance is offset by the revival of evidence gathering. Therefore, once the 
Gant reaching distance rule is imported into the home, the question is whether the Courts 
should import the additional evidence-gathering rule to sustain a holistic doctrinal shift.  
 
B. Impeding Law Enforcement  
Importing both prongs of Gant’s decision is necessary to prevent evidence loss or 
police orchestration of dangerous scenarios. If the narrow reaching distance is not offset 
with evidence gathering, there will be an unequal balance between privacy protection and 
law enforcement interest, crippling the interest of law enforcement. There will be a surge 
of unsafe police practices, intended to elude the narrow scope set by half of the Gant 
decision, to combat the inevitable diminished ability of law enforcement.   
Without importing an offsetting evidence-gathering rule into the home, the 
restricted reaching distance impedes investigative efforts. It also provides officers with 
perverse incentives to fabricate dangerous situations to generate a more expansive search 
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of the home. Operating under a stricter reaching rule, the police will be denied access to 
search parts of the home that they would have been admitted to under the lenient 
interpretation of Chimel.  
The reality of Gant’s restricted reaching distance is that officers will search the 
person they are arresting, handcuff them, place them in the squad car and then leave. 
There will not be an organic opportunity to search the room the person is arrested in, 
other than finding evidence in plain view. This severe consequence is because the first 
course of police procedure is to remove the potentially dangerous suspect from the scene 
of the crime. Once the suspect is detained, there is no threat to officer safety or evidence 
within the home. Therefore, under Gant, there is no search of the home.  
Because of diminished police access, there will be less evidence following an 
arrest. Obtaining evidence is the true purpose of most searches, even though that fact is 
not overtly stated. Removing the opportunity to search the home will endanger police 
collection of incriminating information. Without incriminating evidence, crime control 
will decrease and the police will be hindered in investigative work. 
Courts already acknowledge that these searches are primarily used to find 
evidence of criminal activity. Justice Scalia wrote in his Gant concurrence, “We should 
recognize Belton’s fanciful reliance upon officer safety for what it was: return to the 
broader sort of [evidence-gathering] search incident to arrest that we allowed before 
Chimel” (Gant 1725). Clearly, evidence-gathering searches were allowed before Chimel, 
and should be reinstated as a means to avoid decreased crime control and negative 
incentives for police officers. 
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Denying the true purpose of these searches, gathering evidence of the crime, will 
inevitably lead to law enforcement orchestrating situations to evade the restrictions Gant 
places on their scope. If the singular opportunity police have to search for evidence is 
dependent on articulating a reasonable fear for officer safety or the destruction of 
evidence, then there is motivation to leave a suspect un-handcuffed and present in the 
room. There are perverse incentives to allow a suspect mobility, solely to gain the ability 
to take a look around the room in which they are arrested.  
Courts have to import Gant’s restricted reaching distance into the home to 
harmonize the current anomalous doctrine. Importing Gant’s restricted reaching distance 
will impede law enforcement and decrease police access to search the home. With less 
access comes less evidence and diminished crime control. To balance the interest of law 
enforcement with privacy rights, the courts have to import Gant’s evidence gathering 
prong in conjunction with the restricted reaching distance.   
 
C. Historical Foundation Evidence Gathering 
The second reason to import Gant into the home is the American legal foundation 
of gathering evidence of the crime following an arrest. Chimel v California broke with 
common law when it overcame prior precedent by imposing new limitations and rejecting 
broader justifications to search without a warrant.  T. Taylor’s Two Studies in 
Constitutional Interpretation (1969) details the history of warrantless search incident to 
arrest, “Neither in the reported cases nor the legal literature is there any indication that 
search of the person of an arrestee, or the premises in which he was taken, was ever 
challenged in England until the end of the nineteenth century” (Taylor 29).  
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In history there was no rationalization based on police safety or preservation of 
evidence, though they were convenient side benefits. Evidentiary searches were an 
understood right of law enforcement independent of Chimel’s two reasonings. 
Conducting evidentiary searches after an arrest has been a part of America’s legal fabric 
since the inception of the country.  
 
i. Support from Common Law and Early American Case Law 
Common law supporting police ability to search for evidence incident to an arrest 
was present before the Fourth Amendment was written. It is not suggested that the Fourth 
Amendment overruled or altered this common law. In fact, search incident to arrest falls 
under the extensive list of warrant exceptions, proving the Founding Fathers considered 
the implications of police enforcement searching arrested defendants for evidence.  
Pre-Weeks case trials were firm in their stance that not only was it legal, but it was 
also imperative for police enforcement to search for probative evidence following a 
person’s arrest. In the 1839 case Dillon v O’Brien the court declared, “it is clear, and 
beyond doubt, that… constables… are entitled, upon a lawful arrest by them of one 
charged with treason or felony, to take and detain property found in his possession which 
will form material evidence in his prosecution of that crime” (Riley 2495). Collecting 
evidence is a significant purpose of searching a defendant following their arrest. In 1839, 
the precedent made it clear to the court that it is acceptable to search and seize evidence 
to aid in the suspect’s prosecution.  
J. Bishops’ 1872 Criminal Procedure claims that an officer may seize anything 
that is “directly furnishing evidence related to the transaction.” This means that officers 
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may seize evidence to use in the prosecuting trial. In 1880, F. Wharton’s A Treatise on 
Criminal Pleading and Practice, paralleled the Dillon v O’Brien approach to evidence 
gathering, “Those arresting a defendant are bound to take from his person any articles 
which may be of use as proof in the trial of the offense with which the defendant is 
charged” (Riley 2496).   
Other than their consistent approval of the legality and importance of gathering 
evidence following an arrest, all three sources agree that the evidence must be connected 
to the crime committed. This places an automatic restriction on the scope of evidentiary 
searches. Even in the 1800s, an officer could not arrest someone for a mundane offense 
as pretence to search for evidence of an unrelated crime. Evidence gathering searches are 
not an automatic and pervasive intrusion. They are a beneficial component of crime 
control that occurs after a defendant has decreased his rights to privacy as a result of his 
criminality.   
 
ii. Support from Weeks, Rabinowitz, and Gant 
Weeks solidified a common law foundation that allows officers to seize evidence 
of a crime following a search incident to lawful arrest. Rabinowitz concurred with Weeks 
but enacted a search restriction by adding a required quantum of suspicion. Subsequently, 
Gant revived the validity of historical evidence gathering searches, in part based on these 
two cases. Chimel broke with American legal tradition, and Gant exposed the incorrect 
reasoning behind its decision. These three cases have finely tuned search incident to 
arrest doctrine to remain in line with American legal history while offering citizens 
protection from intrusion. 
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1. Weeks 
Weeks v United States is a cornerstone of search incident to arrest doctrine that set 
three standards: 1) search incident to arrest is a recognized rule, 2) a man’s home is 
classified as his castle, and 3) there is a spatial component in place to restrict the scope of 
searches. These three standards have remained consistent in the century following this 
decision, despite inconsistencies with other interpretations of search incident to arrest 
doctrine.  
Justice Day stated in the Court’s opinion, “It is not an assertion of the right on the 
part of the government always recognized under English and American law, to search the 
person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences 
of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained in many cases” (Weeks 344). This is 
another example of a pre-Chimel decision supporting the right to seize evidence of a 
crime. Day’s opinion clarifies that the police’s right to search incident to arrest is a 
recognized rule in American law.  
Justice Day writes that the privacy of a man’s home is of “high value” to citizens, 
to the degree of being written in the Constitution, and it is the most important of the 
constitutionally protected areas. It is afforded Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure, a truth held in high esteem in our country. However, 
while a man’s home is his castle, and is afforded the greatest expectation of privacy, that 
privacy is diminished once there is a lawful arrest made within the home.  
There is historical precedent to seize the evidence of a crime, not dependent on 
Chimel’s justifications of officer safety or evidence preservation. Justice Day’s opinion 
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on search incident to arrest reveals the intended purpose of the search, which is to collect 
evidence. It is not simply fruits of the crime that can be seized, such as contraband, but 
also evidence of the defendant’s guilt. For example, if a witness noticed the suspect wore 
an identifying piece of clothing, the police could seize the clothing if they found it while 
searching the person. It is not fruit of the crime, but it is evidence incriminating the 
suspect of the crime he was arrested for. 
The United States lost this case because the police searched Weeks’ home despite 
the arrest being made in another location, exceeding the scope of the warrant exception. 
Search incident to arrest has a required spatial element; it is outside the bounds of law to 
search a man’s home without a warrant if he was not arrested in the house. It is in the 
name, the search must be incident to the arrest made. It has to be in the same space as 
well as contemporaneous to the arrest. However, it is within the historical legal scope to 
search his home for evidence incident to arrest. 
 
2. Rabinowitz  
Justice Minton states in the Court’s opinion that there is a longstanding history of 
searching for evidence following an arrest, but acknowledges that there are restrictions 
placed on the authority of law enforcement. It is an indisputable right to search the place 
where an arrest is made to discover and seize; fruits of the crime, weapons, the means by 
which the crime was committed, and tools that can be used to escape custody. This right 
is born, “not only from the acknowledged authority to search the person, but also from 
the longstanding practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the 
accused found upon arrest” (Rabinowitz 433). It is common law that warrantless searches 
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of the scene of arrest are legal. It is also common law that officers are able to search for 
“proofs of guilt.” There is an American legal tradition of looking for evidence of the 
crime during the lawful search of the arrested and the scene of the arrest. 
American courts condemn purely exploratory searches as a counterweight to the 
legal tradition of evidence gathering searches. They constitute an unreasonable search 
incident to arrest and are illegal with or without a warrant. Most cases have expressed 
delineation between evidence gathering and exploratory searches. They are two very 
different entities and search incident to arrest doctrine is specific in protecting people 
from exploratory searches.  
Condemning exploratory searches places an expectation for police to express a 
reasonable suspicion that there will be evidence of the crime committed where they are 
searching. There must be a quantum of suspicion to make evidentiary searches reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. This is a protective measure against intrusive police 
invasion, to search for something they cannot legitimately reason to be there.  
It is a common law right for officers to conduct warrantless searches incident to a 
lawful arrest. However, citizens are protected from intrusive exploratory searches 
because the court system differentiated them from evidence gathering. Holding legal 
evidence gathering searches to a high standard is necessary to protect privacy rights and 
prevent officers from searching a person without justification. 
 
3. Gant 
Gant is the court’s response to Belton’s bright line rule, whose intent was to 
clarify Chimel’s definition of vehicular reaching distance as well as prevent unnecessary 
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litigation, officer confusion, and incentives to generate dangerous situations. Gant 
overturned Belton, rejecting its broader interpretation of Chimel.  Because of Belton’s 
search incident to arrest doctrine, police were always able to search the vehicle passenger 
compartment and all containers within the interior, excluding trunks. Belton takes 
“always” literally; officers never have to articulate a fear for their safety or evidence 
destruction to warrant a search. This reveals the faulty justification of Chimel’s twin 
rationales.  
Belton disregarded Chimel’s original intent to protect officers and evidence when 
it instituted a “time of arrest” approach, which lower courts adopted for almost thirty 
years. The officer can arrest the defendant, remove them from the scene, and then go 
back to conduct a search based on where they could have reached at the time of arrest. 
By applying this procedure, there can be no doubt that the true nature of the search is to 
collect evidence.  
Belton’s bright line rules were intended to elucidate Chimel while allowing the 
police to continue conducting routine searches but with less risk. However, it removed 
the temporal and spatial requirements that might have justified Chimel’s reasoning of 
officer safety and evidence preservation in police procedure. The Court examined 
Belton’s interpretation of Chimel’s two policy reasons, instead of seeing a bright line rule 
that prevented perverse incentives, the Court recognized that the Belton ruling had 
completely diluted the twin rationales of Chimel,  
To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent 
occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications 
underlying the Chimel exception—a result clearly incompatible with our 
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statement in Belton that it ‘in no way alters the fundamental principles 
established in the Chimel case…’ (Gant 1719).  
Once Belton was overturned and the dilution was removed, it remained clear that 
Chimel did not fulfill its reported purposes and its two reasonings were almost 
completely arbitrary in actual application. Chimel had simply created politically correct 
evidence gathering searches. It had artificially, without full explanation, become an 
outlier in search incident to arrest legal history. Not only did it deviate from precedent 
and break common law, it also was an ill-disguised attempt to hide the truth behind police 
procedure.  
Chimel inadvertently created a system that offers less protection from police 
intrusion. By using its broad justification, officers were able to consistently conduct 
intrusive searches after any type of legal arrest. To protect privacy interest, Gant decided 
that there must be “reasonable possibility of access” to a weapon or evidence, returning 
Chimel to its original justification of officer safety and evidence preservation.  
There is not a “reasonable possibility of access” if the defendant is handcuffed in 
the back of the squad car. Because Gant overturned the Belton ruling, to return to the 
original intention in Chimel, it reduced the number of searches police can conduct based 
on a defendant’s reaching distance. Once the Court returned to Chimel, it acknowledged 
that Chimel was not fulfilling its purpose so the Court narrowed the scope of Chimel’s 
search to the “reasonable possibility of access.” 
To offset the restrictive reaching distance and subsequent loss of evidence, Gant 
added an evidence-gathering prong to protect police interests. Reviving the longstanding 
evidence-gathering capability of the police prevents the restricted reaching distance from 
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impeding law enforcement. This adds more control and accountability. Evidence 
gathering searches are more restricted because of their up-front description so there is 
less opportunity to abuse the search. 
The previous reaching distance rule allowed officers to make a valid arrest for any 
reason, for example, a suspended license, and search the interior of the vehicle despite the 
absence of a legitimate reason to search the vehicle for evidence of a suspended license. 
However, to conduct an evidence-gathering search, the officer must be able to articulate a 
reasonable suspicion that there will be fruits of the crime or evidence regarding the crime 
within the car. Comparatively, evidence-gathering searches are more in line with 
restrictions that require an articulable suspicion of guilt, which should be the real reason 
behind a defendant’s diminished privacy expectation 
Gant eroded Chimel, opening a wider variety of searches available to law 
enforcement. However, the wider variety does not translate to a more intrusive police 
presence. To restrain widespread evidence-gathering searches, incident to arrest, the 
officer must be able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that there is legitimate belief 
evidence will be found in the allotted search area. This addition creates a more stringent 
accountability for law enforcement, despite appearances to the contrary.  
This ruling is meant to legitimize the faulty rationales of Chimel and overturn the 
incorrect decision of Belton. As the opinion of the Court said, “We have never relied on 
stare decisis to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice” (Gant 
1722). However, by tethering police procedure to the wording of Chimel, the Court 
needed to incorporate evidence gathering searches to ensure law enforcement interest are 
not overrun.  
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D. Simplicity of Uniform Rules 
Importing evidence gathering into the home will construct uniform rules that will 
supply greater clarity for police enforcement to apply congruent doctrine for each arrest 
situation. As the current doctrine stands, police must operate on two completely different 
standards for vehicles and homes. Operating under the purview of one standard doctrine 
will create consistency for law enforcement, the public, and the Court system. 
If it is possible to have the identical doctrine for both scenarios, it is sensible to 
use uniform operating procedure for simplicity in teaching and enforcement. Confusion 
about the scope of law enforcement will decrease, as well as confusion among citizens 
who are not well informed of their privacy rights. With a consistent doctrine, there will 
be a greater understanding of what is allowed and with a better understanding comes a 
more accountable law enforcement. 
 
54 
VI. Defining the Contours of the Evidence Gathering Search in the Home 
To regulate privacy intrusion, the Court needs to set restrictive rules to define the 
area available to search under Gant’s evidence-gathering prong. Tightly balancing 
privacy protection with law enforcement interest is the only way evidence gathering 
searches will be effective. It is vital to ensure workability and ease of adopting for the 
police department. There are three constraints the courts can employ to limit intrusive 
searches. 
1) Implementing a finite spatial dimension that law enforcement cannot exceed 
will restrict the potential intrusiveness of searching the entire home under the guise of 
evidence gathering. Having a standard range will assist in an easy transition for law 
enforcement and cut down on legislation that argues law enforcement is overreaching 
their bounds. 
2) Maintaining a required and articulable quantum of suspicion ensures police are 
accountable for justifying the instigation of the search. It will protect privacy against the 
easily abused search incident to arrest doctrine if an arrest does not automatically 
constitute an evidence-gathering search. 
3) There must be a digital data exception to ensure the defendant’s privacy is fully 
protected. Modern cellular and digital devices contain a surplus of information that 
exceeds the scope of evidence typically available in a physical search. A warrant is 
necessary to prevent that heightened level of intrusion. 
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A. Spatial Dimension of Search: Spaces Immediately Adjoining the Places of 
Arrest 
Once evidence gathering is recognized as a legitimate police search in homes, 
boundaries must be set to prevent abusing the scope of the search. The evidence-
gathering prong does not authorize the police to search the entire home, basement to attic, 
but has perimeters to regulate the intrusiveness. The place of arrest holds firm. Police are 
not allowed to manipulate the suspect and walk him through the home before officially 
arresting him or taking him on a tour of his home on the way to the squad car, all for the 
guise of broadening the space available to police search. Trying to work around the 
restricted search area is illegal and creates dangerous situations for police officers. Where 
the police find the suspect is where law enforcement is bound to arrest him, and from that 
spot the police are allowed to implement the Buie sweep and subsequent evidence 
gathering search.  
While performing a home arrest, police are currently allowed a Buie sweep of the 
areas that immediately adjoin the place of arrest as a protective measure against attacks 
from accomplices of the arrestee. Combined with plain view doctrine, there is already a 
search for evidence happening in these areas. The police are allowed to go into adjoining 
rooms, open closet doors, and seize any contraband or fruits of the crime that are visible. 
If the room is already free game for a search, the only difference evidence gathering will 
make is the ability for officers to look in containers that are too small for a person to hide 
in.  
Confining Gant’s evidence gathering search onto the boundaries set by the Buie 
sweep keeps the doctrine consistent for the purposes of law enforcement and future 
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litigation in courts. Searches of the areas immediately adjoining the arrest are already 
permitted and the police can seize anything in plain view, so the addition of evidence 
gathering in these locations does not result in a drastic alteration of current procedure.  
Aligning the Gant evidentiary searches to the Buie sweep sets the spatial 
dimension of evidence gathering to an area already available for police inspection, which 
will simplify the transition to evidence gathering searches. It will also maintain set 
boundaries to protect the privacy of the home and ensure there are not widespread 
evidence gathering searches throughout the entire home. 
It will be beyond the scope of the police to search the entire, if not most, of the 
home solely for evidence. The home is man’s castle and has the greatest protection 
available under the Constitution. Setting perimeters to prevent police abuse of Gant’s rule 
for home searches is imperative to protect the Constitutional integrity protecting the 
home. 
 
B. Required Quantum of Suspicion  
Gant is not an automatic blanket search but has a requirement of an articulable 
quantum of suspicion; law enforcement must articulate a reasonable suspicion that there 
is legitimate potential to find evidence of the crime committed for an evidence-gathering 
search to take place. This is a protective measure against manipulative arrests made to 
access a space in which there may be evidence of another crime. 
There is a dispute over Gant’s quantum of suspicion because the decision’s 
wording claims the required quantum of suspicion is a “reasonable basis to believe.” It is 
understood that a reasonable basis to believe does not constitute probable cause. This is 
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clarified because vehicles already have probable cause automobile exception. Officers are 
allowed to search an automobile if there is probable cause that evidence or contraband is 
in the vehicle. This exception is in place because of the inherent exigency caused by 
vehicular mobility. Because there is already a probable cause exception, it would make 
no sense for the Court to reiterate what is already there. That insinuates that the quantum 
of suspicion is lower than the current quantum required to enact the automobile warrant 
exception.  If the required quantum of suspicion is not probable cause, then the next 
standard is a “reasonable suspicion.” It is a well-litigated standard that can be used in 
homes and vehicles. There is no reason to think the Court created a third level of 
suspicion between probable cause and reasonable suspicion because there is no need to 
complicate an issue that is already well understood by law enforcement.  
If law enforcement pulls over a suspected drug dealer for driving with a 
suspended license, they are not authorized to search the car because it is unreasonable to 
expect to find evidence of a suspended license within the vehicle. If the police want to 
search the car to find narcotics, they will have to arrest the suspect for a crime related to 
narcotics. Falsely made charges will not meet the requirements necessary to search the 
vehicle.  
The same logic holds for a home, if the police are called for a noise complaint and 
arrest the perpetrator because they were uncooperative, an evidence search will not be 
conducted. There will not be evidence of the arrestee’s loud music or disagreeable nature 
within the home. Therefore, the only search allowed would be the Buie sweep for 
dangerous persons. Plain view will, of course, still be available to the police but they will 
not be able to look into small containers. 
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Enforcing a quantum of suspicion that requires reasonableness will act as a 
deterrent against routine instigation of evidence-gathering searches. If a judge has the 
power to decide in court that the police searched for evidence without reasonable 
suspicion, the evidence found from the search can be suppressed based on the 
exclusionary rule. With more accessibility to the home, the police have a higher standard 
to explain their actions. 
Importing evidence gathering into the home is the logical extension of the Gant 
decision, especially when one examines the restrictions that will be in place. However, 
there are subsequent cases that deal with evidence gathering that need to be considered 
when importing Gant into the home. 
Riley v California complicates the introduction of evidence gathering into the 
home because it prohibits officers from searching the cellular device of the arrestee for 
the sole purpose of gaining evidence. However, if Riley is considered an exception to the 
evidence-gathering rule, then importing Gant into the home is still possible.  
Incorporating a bright line exception of digital data in the search and seizure of an 
arrestee’s home artifacts, will allow evidence gathering in the home. While the evidence-
gathering search is restricted to the boundaries set by Buie, there is an exception to the 
scope of the search based on the Supreme Court decision in Riley that protects digital 
data from being searched and seized without a warrant. If digital data falls within Buie’s 
parameters, it will still require a warrant for police search. 
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C. Digital Device Exception Following Riley v California  
To ensure consistent doctrinal execution, the courts must insert a digital device 
exception into the home evidence-gathering prong. In Riley v California the Supreme 
Court decided that law enforcement must generate a search warrant during a lawful 
search incident to arrest before they are able to search the information accessible on a cell 
phone.  
Comparatively speaking, claiming a cell phone has a higher expectation of 
privacy and requires a search warrant insinuates that the home, which also has a higher 
expectation of privacy, will require a search warrant for an evidence-gathering search. 
However, if one looks at the proposed scope of the home evidence-gathering search, they 
will see the similarities in vehicular and cellular searches that align the privacy 
expectation of the home with vehicles.  
A room is similar to the interior of a vehicle, while a computer is similar to a 
cellular device. A room and vehicle have a reasonable limit to the amount of physical 
items and evidence that can be inside them. A computer or cell phone does not have a 
reasonable limit and they operate in a cyber world as opposed to a physical one. 
Restricting access to digital data is another boundary that will protect privacy interests.  
It would support both Gant and Riley to allow evidence gathering in a room but to 
exclude digital data. The reasoning behind the exclusion lies in the vast amounts of 
information available to the police upon inspection of a computer. Within one digital 
device, there could be information equivalent to enough documentation that would 
physically exceed the space of the entire room or be connected to other properties the 
suspect owns.  
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Justice Alito explains the reasoning behind the Riley decision “many cell phones 
now in use are capable of storing and accessing a quantity of information, some highly 
personal, that no person would ever have had on his person in hard-copy form” (Riley 
2496). There is more information readily available than law enforcement has ever been 
able to access in the past. If police wanted to see incriminating photos, they used to have 
to develop the film in an analog camera. The only pictures available would be the twenty 
or so on the film roll. Now if the police went to a person’s photo file on the computer or 
phone, they could access years of pictures and gather much more information about the 
person. Because of the widespread use and role of digital devices, it is necessary to 
balance privacy and law enforcement on the digital stage.  
While there should be an exception for digital data because of the above 
reasoning, Justice Alito calls for Congress to write legislation to respond to the changing 
digital data sphere. He claims, “It would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 
21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the 
Fourth Amendment” (Riley 2497). It is not within the judiciary's power to handle the 
intricacies of digital legality. It is better for the courts to stay separate and not attempt to 
find the solution to digital privacy through a court decision.  
The best way the courts can protect the people’s privacy, with the “blunt 
instrument of the Fourth Amendment” is to make a standard exception to digital data in 
warrantless searches. By creating a broad standard, the judiciary expresses their opinion 
on its right to privacy protection but recognizes that the legislature will have to be the 
guiding force in digital policy. The Courts do not possess the nuance to deftly orchestrate 
digital data rules by case law alone.  
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VII. Academic Literature Review 
In the years following Arizona v Gant, academic literature has clarified Gant’s 
implications on search incident to arrest doctrine and its construction in the face of police 
procedure. Three questions consistently arise when examining Gant; 1) whether Gant is 
applicable to all searches, 2) the meaning of “reasonable possibility of access”, and 3) the 
functionality of the evidence-gathering rule. However, there is a hole in academic 
literature regarding the doctrinal implications of Gant and Chimel. This thesis is the first 
to argue that Gant cannot remain the standard for only vehicles and not also be extended 
into homes because it inverts the logical range of police authority.  
By examining three articles on these issues, this article hopes to shine a light on 
the current debates regarding Gant in academic literature and where this thesis falls on 
the spectrum. The article will also be looking at oppositional articles and examining the 
academic reasoning not to adopt Gant. Then it will look at a lower court case’s 
interpretation of Gant and the implications it has on the proposal to incorporate Gant into 
the home. 
Sean Foley argues that Gant is applicable to all types of searches in his article 
“The Newly Murky World of Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest: Why the Gant 
Restrictions Should Apply to All Searches Incident to Arrest.”  His article claims that 
there are logical, doctrinal, and Constitutional reasons to extend Gant beyond a vehicular 
context. However, Foley is only arguing about the extension of Gant’s reaching distance 
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and not the importation of evidence gathering into the home. This is a critical 
oversight in his argument and the importance of accounting for Gant’s second prong 
cannot be overstated.   
If one logically reviews the purpose of the case, it is evident that Gant is not 
confined to vehicular situations despite its narrow holding. Gant “resurrected and 
retethered” search incident to arrest to Chimel’s original policy goals. Chimel did not 
involve car searches but dealt with home searches. Despite Gant being a case about 
vehicles, the doctrine that justifies its reasoning is broader than vehicular situations. 
The reasoning behind Gant, restricting officer’s reach based on their possibility to 
access to weapons or evidence, is not refuted by the absence of a vehicle. The same 
justification applies for arrests made in homes as well as public places. Chimel is the 
authority for all search incident to arrest cases. Therefore, if Gant returns police 
procedure to Chimel’s intended purpose, it is logical that Gant would apply to all cases 
that Chimel controls. Foley’s argument supports the most fundamental component of my 
argument; it is an obvious extension to broaden Gant’s scope beyond a vehicular context. 
But Foley only focuses on the restricted reaching distance, and ignores evidence 
gathering 
As Foley writes, “An access limitation ‘ensures that the scope of a search incident 
to arrests is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and 
safeguarding any evidence of the arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy’” (779). 
Gant’s interpretation that a defendant must have access to the area being searched is not 
constrained in vehicular searches. If an arrestee does not have access to his home, say 
they have already been placed in the squad car, then the rationales of officer safety and 
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evidence preservation are arbitrary. Because of this, Gant’s doctrine needs to extend to 
all searches incident to arrest. 
Another reason to extend Gant is the constitutional ramifications of having a 
broad warrant exception. To ensure privacy protection, warrant exceptions should be 
narrowly construed. Foley explains, “This exception should be read narrowly and limited 
to those situations in which society does not require a neutral and detached magistrate to 
stand between the citizen and ‘the officer engaged in the… competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime’” (777). It is always better to err on the side of protecting a known 
constitutional guarantee such as the warrant requirement. 
Foley’s article fails to account for more than just the extension of evidence 
gathering in conjunction to restricted reaching distance. The one reason to expand Gant 
that Foley’s article does not account for is the doctrinal disconnect Gant causes between 
home and privacy expectations. His arguments are valid, it is logical to assume that by 
returning to Chimel the search incident to arrest decisions fall beneath Chimel’s scope, 
the doctrinal decision behind Gant does not change with the absence of a vehicle, and it 
protects constitutional interests to have narrow warrant exceptions. However, Foley 
overlooks one of the most important issues, vehicles anomalously have more privacy 
protection than homes because of the Gant decision. That is the most significant reason 
Gant must be imported into the home. 
The second question, what does “real possibility of access” mean in application, is 
discussed in Anthony Ruiz’ article, “Defining Gant’s Reach: The Search Incident to 
Arrest Doctrine After Arizona v Gant.” Ruiz argues that there are doctrinal reasons to 
incorporate a strict interpretation of “real possibility of access.” 
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Lower courts have divided opinions regarding the leniency police operate under 
when determining “real possibility of access.”  Originally, the Court claimed the standard 
was whether the arrestee was “unsecured and within reaching distance” at the time of the 
search. However, courts have deviated from this practical application and have opted for 
a more nebulous reading. Now, the debate is between a theoretical possibility of access or 
a reasonable one. 
United States v Shakir rejected the two-prong reasonableness approach and 
refocused on the wording of Gant to allow a broader interpretation of possibility of 
access. Shakir was handcuffed and restrained by two officers but the court upheld the 
search of his bag, showing a clearly lenient approach. The court argued that handcuffs are 
not a completely infallible and should not be the basis for determining reasonable 
possibility of access. The decision fulfilled its intended purpose of awarding police 
greater opportunity to search suspects. 
However, the Shakir decision was controversial in the face of Gant’s return to a 
strict Chimel. In United States v Perdoma, Judge Bye’s dissent claimed the search 
conducted was invalid because of the same circumstances that Shakir claimed were 
reasonable. Perdoma was handcuffed, moved to another area, and secured by officers 
who then searched his bag, finding methamphetamine. Judge Bye argued that Perdoma’s 
possibility to access a weapon or evidence was “farfetched” and the search should have 
been illegal. As Ruiz writes, “A repudiation of Belton is thus a repudiation of the lenient 
standard it created. And, in most instances, once an officer has handcuffed a suspect, 
there is no reasonable possibility of access” (354). 
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Because the Court rejected Belton, they simultaneously rejected the justification 
behind broad and lenient interpretations of warrantless searches. This assumption can be 
validated with the Court’s wording in the Gant opinion. They were clear that officers will 
almost always be secure at the scene of the crime and there will be few instances where a 
reasonable possibility of access will justify a search incident to arrest. In application, 
Chimel’s rationales are typically useless when searching a vehicle. Their claim that it will 
be a “rare case” in which an arrestee possesses reasonable possibility of access insinuates 
that most situations would not allow searches incident to arrest. If searches are 
significantly decreased, it is doubtful the Court desired a lenient standard to determine an 
arrestee’s access. 
Ruiz’s article aligns with this article’s proposed interpretation of Gant. When 
Gant overturned Belton and retethered search incident to arrest doctrine to the literal 
wording of Chimel, it made a statement about the excessive intrusiveness of police 
procedure. Without following the proposed restricted reaching distance, there is no need 
to revive the evidence gathering search. However, by restricting unnecessary police 
intrusion and then balancing police interests by allowing evidence gathering searches, the 
courts have returned to the historical and common law legal foundation of search incident 
to arrest. It legitimizes police procedure and realigns with precedent. It is imperative that 
courts uphold the intended corrective purpose of Gant. 
The third question, what does the evidence gathering rule look like, is examined 
in Seth Stoughton’s article, “Modern Police Practices: Arizona v Gant’s illusory 
restriction of vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest.” Gant heavily restricted law 
enforcement’s reach but compensated for potential crime control loss by resuscitating the 
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evidence-gathering search. Does the evidence gathering search free police from the 
restraints placed on their Chimel shackles? 
Police are only allowed to conduct an evidentiary search if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that evidence of the crime for which the person is arrested, will be found in the 
vehicle. Critics argue that this will be restrictive to police enforcement, but the reality is 
that only one in three officers makes an arrest for a traffic violation in the span of a year. 
 Gant eliminates traffic offense searches, stopping the manipulation of traffic laws to 
comprehend suspects of other crimes. However, if only one in three officers even makes 
arrests for a traffic offense, then most arrests are obviously not of that nature. 
Stoughton argues, “Vehicle occupants are arrested for crimes for which the fact of 
arrest itself establishes reasonable suspicion” (1748). This means that officers typically 
arrest a vehicle occupant for driving under the influence or possession of contraband, 
both of which would authorize the officer to search the vehicle. Even though it is not 
criminal to possess alcohol in a vehicle, finding alcohol in the car of a person charged 
with a DUI is inculpatory and can be seized as incriminating evidence against the 
arrestee. 
To put this in context, Belton was arrested for a drug crime whereas Gant was 
arrested for driving with a suspended license. Both were pulled over for traffic violations, 
Belton for speeding and Gant for a suspended license, but Belton was arrested because of 
drugs, not the traffic violation. The officer then had the right to search Belton’s car for 
more narcotics and whatever he found while conducting the search can be used as 
evidence. However, since Gant was arrested for a suspended license, there was no 
reasonable suspicion that evidence of that arrest could be found within the car. 
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The assumption that Gant will significantly decrease officer’s opportunity to 
search a vehicle incident to arrest is erroneous. Evidence gathering will prevent the 
restriction because the majority of traffic related arrests are situations that give an officer 
reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle for evidence of a crime. Even when a vehicular 
search is not warranted, the officer will be able to search the person they arrest. If drugs 
or contraband is found on the person, then they will have a reasonable suspicion to extend 
the search into the car. 
Stoughton’s statistics support my claim that adding evidence gathering balances 
the interests of law enforcement with the privacy interests of the public. Restricting the 
reaching distance will prevent manipulative arrests, but when combined with evidence 
gathering, it will not prevent officers from conducting much needed searches. Privacy 
protection is important, but it is just as important to allow police the space and 
capabilities to perform their job to control crime. 
Among the multitude of articles that attempt to clarify Gant, there are some that 
claim it should not be adopted at all. David L. Berland’s article, “Stopping the Pendulum: 
Why Stare Decisis Should Constrain the Court from Further Modification of the Search 
Incident to Arrest Exception” details three policy issues with Gant and the more 
encompassing judicial dependence of stare decisis. 
Broadly speaking, search incident to arrest doctrine has had a tumultuous history 
with the Court either overturning or modifying search incident to arrest doctrine seven 
times (Berland 729). The doctrine has yo-yoed between strict and lenient but has 
consistently been decided based on Justices finding the “correct outcome.” This is 
problematic because it erodes the stability of the judicial branch. Their power comes from 
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the fact that their decisions, once made, are supposed to be permanent. It is clear that is 
not the case; Justices are not constrained by stare decisis if they have been able to change 
their minds seven times. 
Berland makes valid points about the importance of stare decisis and the 
instability derived from failing to abide by it. However, it should not be the cause for 
overturning Gant. As the Court has stated, stare decisis does not prevent the court from 
overturning decisions that are unconstitutional and most can agree that Belton’s doctrine 
was invasive. 
Despite the clear dismissal of stare decisis in the past, the Court should not 
abruptly stop their evolution of search incident to arrest doctrine simply to conform to 
stare decisis because of exasperation that the pendulum has gone on long enough. It 
seems likely that during the seven doctrinal modifications, some were made despite a 
constitutional precedent and thus were opinion based. However, in Gant’s case it is a 
decision based on unconstitutional grounds and should not be diminished because of the 
history it is building upon. 
Berland’s most persuasive arguments against the Gant decision are police reliance 
on Belton’s doctrine, the workability of Gant, and the absence of changed circumstances. 
Berland claims that police are reliant on the bright-line rules that are already in place. 
However, Justice Stevens acknowledges the implications of redoing the police standard 
and claimed it negligible to the merit of overturning unconstitutional doctrine. Berland 
argues that in the interim of police mastering Gant’s rules “more evidence will be 
suppressed because officers will unwittingly continue to commit what are not 
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unconstitutional Belton searches” (720). He makes the sweeping claim that disregarding 
the reliance on Belton impacted not only the police officers but also society at large. 
The reasoning for claiming that reliance is a significant hurdle is faulty at best. 
From an ideological standpoint, it is against everything America represents to knowingly 
allow unconstitutional practices, especially privacy intrusion, for the convenience of a 
governmental body. Disregarding the blatant indifference for American values, it also 
discounts the intelligence of the police. Constraining their standard operating procedure 
should not result in a failure of police enforcement, and even if it does it should not be a 
significant length of time. 
The Gant rule is simultaneously so strict yet lenient that it should be easy to 
follow. It is strict in the sense that if an officer arrests someone for any reason, such as an 
expired license, that will not have evidence of the crime within the vehicle, they cannot 
search the vehicle. The only exception to that is if there is a reason to believe there is 
danger to the officer or evidence. It will be a rare instance when the officer searches the 
vehicle because of danger to an officer or evidence preservation. The officer will always 
search the body of the person, restrain them, and then remove them from the scene of the 
incident. 
However, it is lenient because the officer has the authority to search a vehicle if 
there is a reasonable expectation that there will be evidence of the crime committed in the 
vehicle. Most vehicular arrest will fall under this jurisdiction and there will be inherent 
justification that there might be evidence because of the nature of the situation. Also, if 
the police arrest a defendant for something that does not justify a search but they find 
evidence of a crime on their person, they will have a reasonable excuse to extend the 
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search to the vehicle. Because of the dichotomy of strict and lenient, intentionally 
orchestrated in that manner, the police have fairly straightforward rules to follow. 
However, even if the rules were significantly more difficult, that is not reason to remain 
with unconstitutional doctrine. 
Workability is the next issue Berland points to, stating that the phrase “reasonable 
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle” will 
result in new ambiguities (721). Because of the ambiguous phrasing, Berland claims that 
Belton was more workable than Gant. However, defining reasonable is not too difficult, 
mainly because it has been present throughout the entirety of American legal history. The 
Fourth Amendment itself protects citizens from unreasonable seizures, insinuating that a 
reasonable seizure is recognizable. It is not an amorphous concept but one that is 
established throughout case law. 
The third issue, and the one that has the most credence, is the lack of changed 
circumstances to prompt a reworking of policy. The reason for a stricter rule is that 
Belton undermines the two purposes of Chimel, officer safety and evidence preservation. 
Justice Alito points out that the Supreme Court knew in 1981 that there was little 
likelihood of a person accessing weapons or evidence once handcuffed in a squad car. 
Not only did the Court know this in 1981, they also applied Belton five years before the 
Gant decision in the case Thornton v United States. Granted the argument that nullifies 
this mimics the other faults of Berland’s article. It simply does not matter if the court was 
aware of the same circumstances if the previous decision is deemed unconstitutional.   
Berland’s claim that stare decisis supports upholding Belton instead of 
implementing Gant, but this article argues that Gant is a corrective decision that is 
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unifying the pendulum of search incident to arrest precedent. Chimel is an outlier in 
search incident to arrest doctrine that reworded the reasons behind police searches, and 
exasperated the controversy of search incident to arrest. Belton made the issue even 
worse. Gant, on the other hand, overturned the faulty Belton and tied Chimel to the 
history of search incident to arrest doctrine by reviving evidence gathering searches. 
Literature that examines the application of Gant argues that Gant should extend to 
all searches, there should not be a lenient interpretation of “real possibility of access,” 
and reintroducing evidence gathering will ensure continued law enforcement. Gant 
should extend to all searches because it is founded in Chimel, which is the precedent for 
all search incident to arrest situations. There should be a strict interpretation of “real 
possibility of access” because the Gant court heavily hinted that was their intention with 
the decision. Evidence gathering will continue the authority of the police but will have its 
foundation in realistic and truthful explanations.  
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Conclusion 
Importing Gant’s restricted reach and evidence gathering into the home is the 
logical extension of modern search incident to arrest doctrine. It is necessary to unify the 
separate spheres in which it operates and rectify the anomaly of greater vehicular 
protection. Once the broader issue is resolved and vehicles have equal or less protection 
than homes, then the main concern becomes workability of extending Gant. It is illogical 
to import only half of a doctrine. Importing Gant’s restricted reaching rule is imperative 
to resolve the doctrinal tension. However, it must be followed by the importation of 
evidence gathering searches to prevent the loss of crime control and balance police 
interests. There must be guidelines to ensure consistent police procedure and protect the 
privacy of the home. By constraining evidence gathering searches to the boundaries of a 
Bouie search and creating a digital device exception, police intrusion will be minimal. 
The policy and procedural impact make the changes logical, but the justification is in 
precedent. Chimel artificially narrowed common law and Gant’s revival of evidence 
gathering is simply returning to a time honored American tradition. 
This article is a small component of a bigger issue concerning what privacy can 
citizens reasonably expect. Do the police have the right to search without a warrant 
and/or a valid justification? That is what Chimel and Belton subtly insinuate. The law 
drifted further and further from protecting the rights of the people, until Gant resurrected 
legitimate police concern and privacy interests. Police search to gather evidence. 
However, if the legal community paints that as an aberration and tries to hide the reality 
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behind nicely worded doctrine, the police are given even more power. Instead, the 
truth needs to be exposed so that it can be regulated. Gant is controversial because it 
plainly states the intention of law enforcement. This intention is the same in vehicles and 
homes. Police are looking for evidence. It is baffling to look at doctrine that ensures 
homes have less protection than vehicles, but that is a product of gilded law enforcement. 
This problem would never have been an issue if the Courts were transparent concerning 
the basic truth of searches. This article is meant to strike the appropriate balance between 
privacy interests and police interests in the Fourth Amendment. Ultimately, search 
incident to arrest doctrine boils down to interpreting constitutional provisions. This 
version of interpretation is faithful and true to the text of the Fourth Amendment, while 
balancing the protection of people’s rights with the societal benefits of crime control. 
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